Since the letter of this article, Arafat`s death in 2004 has changed the leadership of the Palestinian Authority. Israel unilaterally withdrew from the Gaza Strip in 2005 and shortly after the terrorist group Hamas took control, Hamas started two wars. Israel and the Palestinian Authority have returned to the negotiating table, the last time for talks that failed in 2014, but the hopes for peace and security offered by the Oslo Accords have still not been fulfilled. The stated objectives of the Oslo Accords were, among other things, transitional Palestinian autonomy (not the Palestinian Authority, but the Palestinian Legislative Council)[10] and the lasting resolution of unresolved issues within five years, on the basis of Security Council resolutions 242 and 338. Although the agreements recognize Palestinian “legitimate and political rights,” they remain silent on their fate after the transition period. The Oslo Accords do not define the nature of Palestinian autonomy after Oslo, their powers and responsibilities, nor the boundaries of the territory it would eventually govern. While Peres, at the request of U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, had only limited settlement construction,[24] Mr. Netanyahu continued his construction in existing Israeli settlements[25] and presented plans for the construction of a new neighborhood, Har Homa, in East Jerusalem. But it remained well below the level of the Shamir government from 1991 to 1992 and gave up on building new settlements, although the Oslo Accords did not provide for such a ban. [24] Construction of housing units off Oslo: 1991-92: 13,960, After Oslo: 1994-95: 3,840, 1996-1997: 3,570.

[26] Yitzhak Rabin, Prime Minister of Israel at the time of the signing of the agreements (murdered in 1995 by a right-wing Israeli), said that the Palestinian Authority would fight terrorism more effectively than the Israelis could because it would work without restrictions imposed by “human rights groups and the Supreme Court of Israel”. In that statement, he expressed the hope that many Israelis were behind the agreement for an anti-terrorism alliance between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. The Oslo Accords have even set up “joint patrols” where Israeli and Palestinian soldiers patrol side by side to prevent terrorist attacks. This constructive ambiguity, which is part of every element of the agreements, has proved extremely destructive. Instead of building trust and allowing the parties to adapt to the reality of the inevitable compromises necessary for peace, it simply allowed each side to exist in its own selfish interpretation of what the agreements implied and to pursue precisely the behavior that destroyed trust on the other side. And so, a few years later, when it came time to resolve the essential issues, the failure that followed was almost inevitable. In the view of many Israelis, the dynamics of Israeli-Palestinian relations since the signing of the Oslo Accords confirmed their worst fears: that the Oslo process would give tools to a militant enemy and that areas would be created for bloody terrorist attacks against Israelis. Early on, when the Palestinian Authority`s security services were set up, Israeli observers found that the number of Palestinians in arms and the type of weapons transferred to Palestinian Authority territory far exceeded the limits set by the agreements.